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SUING THE OSBOURNES: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR CREATIVE
MERCHANDISE
I. INTRODUCTION
"Anna Nicole ate my little brother." "Bin Laden is a big fat
doodiehead." "Brittany is a whore." These are just a few of the
offensive t-shirt messages you will find at tshirthell.com.1 T-Shirt
Hell, Inc. ("T-Shirt Hell") is an online t-shirt company that profits
from its off-color comments regarding celebrities and current
events. T-Shirt Hell's web site enables its visitors to purchase t-
shirts online and to submit their own ideas for provocative t-shirt
phrases.2  The company's t-shirt phrases range from political
mockery to obscene celebrity critique. Although many of the
shirts are capable of causing controversy, one shirt in particular
has thrust this online company into the legal spotlight. The shirt at
issue reads, "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE
OSBOURNES! '
The infamous t-shirt draws its humor from MTV's hit television
show "The Osbournes. ' '  The reality-based sitcom follows the
lives of heavy metal legend Ozzy Osbourne and his rock-and-roll
family.5 The selling point of "The Osbournes" is the uniquely
humorous lifestyle that the dysfunctional family leads.6 Ozzy's
previous battles with drugs and alcohol have left him in a
I See Tshirthell.com: Where All The Bad Shirts Go, available at
http://www.tshirthell.com (last visited May 2, 2003).
2. See The Other Shit, available at
http://www.tshirthell.com/theothershit.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
3. See The Osbourne Family Stole Our Shirt, available at
http://www.tshirthell.com./miscpages/osboumes.shtml (last visited May 2,
2003).
4. Id.
5. See The Osbournes, available at http://www.mtv.com/onair/osbournes
(last visited May 2, 2003).
6. Id.
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vulnerable and peculiar state.7 His constant mumbling, swearing,
and inability to perform some of the most basic household tasks
have kept Americans laughing.8 Other hilarious elements of the
show include Ozzy's children who constantly bicker, and his
dozens of pets that roam the house defecating on his pricey
furnishings.9 After only one season, America was hooked and the
Osbournes became one of the most recognized families in
American culture."°
In May of 2002, T-Shirt Hell filed suit against the Osbournes
and several other defendants for infringing their t-shirt slogan
"FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE
OSBOURNES." The complaint alleged that the defendants
authorized the manufacture and sale of t-shirts bearing a similar
slogan, which resulted in trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 2 The impetus for this Article came from this ironic
lawsuit. It seems that a celebrity should have the right to profit off
of his own name. This Article will evaluate the merit of T-Shirt
Hell's legal claims against the Osbournes. The overall objective of
this Article is to consider whether creative merchandise is capable
of acquiring intellectual property protection.
T-shirts, coffee cups, hats and other souvenirs often contain
lucrative phrases. It is these creative words that persuade the
consumer to buy the otherwise ordinary merchandise. It seems
there should be some way to protect these profitable phrases from
the blatant copying and unjust enrichment of others. However,
much uncertainty exists regarding the legal protections available
for creative merchandise. One of the primary reasons for this
uncertainty is that creative merchandise and t-shirt phrases do not
clearly fall within a specific area of intellectual property. Still,
protection for such merchandise is not totally out of the question.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See T-Shirt Hell Inc. v. Signatures Network, Inc., No. 02 CV 4026
(S.D.N.Y Compl. filed May 28, 2002).
12. Id. at 3.
[Vol. XIII: 123
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This Article is organized into four main sections. Part II will
discuss relevant background information regarding trademark and
copyright law, right of publicity, and unfair competition. 3 In this
section, the requirements for acquiring each type of intellectual
property protection will be discussed as well as the proof required
for establishing infringement. The complaint filed by T-shirt Hell
will also be discussed in greater detail. In Part III, the phrase at
issue, "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE
OSBOURNES," will be analyzed to determine if it qualifies for
trademark or copyright protection. The validity of T-Shirt Hell's
unfair competition and trademark infringement claims will also be
considered. Additionally, the analysis will suggest possible
conflicts between T-Shirt Hell's phrase and the Osbournes' right
of publicity. In Part IV, the impact of the Osboume case will be
discussed as it applies to the intellectual property protections
available for creative merchandise.
II BACKGROUND
This section will begin with a basic discussion of trademark law
and the Lanham Act. Relevant cases will be explored to
demonstrate how t-shirt phrases fail to meet some of the most
fundamental trademark requirements. Statutory limitations
concerning the content of trademarks will also be considered.
Next, the Copyright Act will be discussed as well as the
different elements a work must possess in order to acquire
copyright protection. Case law will be examined for its discussion
on the copyrightability of jokes and other short phrases.
Additionally, the requisite proof for establishing copyright
infringement will be set forth.
Third, the right of publicity will be discussed. Again, relevant
case law will be examined to illustrate when the court has found a
violation of this intellectual property right. Finally, the principles
behind unfair competition will be briefly discussed.
13. See infra notes 14-190 and accompanying text.
2003]
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A. Trademark Protection
The term trademark is defined as any "word, name, symbol, or
device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others."' 4 A trademark
is the owner's way of preventing others from tricking consumers
into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the
trademark owner. 5 Not every word or phrase functions as a
trademark. To qualify as a mark, the term or slogan must
communicate a single source for the goods in question. 6
Trademarks also convey information about the product's or
service's nature and quality. 7 A critical element in determining
whether a term functions as a trademark is the impression that the
term makes on the relevant public. 8
14. See In re Remington Products, Inc., No. 493,829, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 91
(stating "mere intent that a term function as a trademark is not enough in and of
itself, any more than attachment of the trademark symbol would be, to make a
term a trademark"). Id. at *4.
15. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305
(9th Cir. 1992).
16. See Remington, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 91 at *3-4 (citing In re Morganroth,
208 U.S.P.Q 284 (TTAB 1990)). See also ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS &
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 7 (1996). See
Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). A trademark
informs people that the trademarked products come from the same source. The
core purpose of a trademark is to prevent consumer confusion in the
marketplace. Id. at 900.
17. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra notel6, at 24.
18. See Remington, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 91. Here, the Board considered
whether the slogan "PROUDLY MADE IN THE USA" functioned as a
trademark. Id. at * 1. The Board inquired into whether the term was perceived
as a source indicator or merely an informational slogan. Id. at *2. The Board
held that the applicant's slogan merely conveyed information to the public about
the products locale of manufacture. Id. at *5. The inclusion of the word
"PROUDLY" simply added further information about the state of mind of the
manufacturer and its employees in connection with the goods. Id. Since
purchasers would not recognize the slogan as a source indicator, the slogan was
not registerable. Id. at *7.
[Vol. XIII 123
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1. Protection for T-Shirt Phrases
In In re Pro-Line Corporation", the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board explicitly discussed the functional requirement of a
trademark as it applied to t-shirt phrases. In its analysis, the Board
discussed how t-shirts are often ornamented with various insignia,
including college insignia, or various sayings."0  The Board
explained that if such ornamentation had no other meaning, it
could not serve as indicia of source.2" However, the Board
recognized that matter which serves as part of the aesthetic
ornamentation of goods could be registered as a trademark if it
also serves as a source-indicator.
Here, the applicant sought to register the phrase "BLACKER
THE COLLEGE SWEETER THE KNOWLEDGE."2 The phrase
appeared on t-shirts in large, bold letters that immediately caught
the eye.23 The phrase was meant to promote the value of an
education at the institutions listed in small type below.24 The
Board held that the applicant's phrase was primarily an ornamental
slogan.25  The applicant argued that because the shirt also
displayed the term "PRO-LINE," the source of the goods, the
19. No. 74/174, 721, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 24.
20. Id. at *2.
21. Id. at *4. The applicant can submit evidence showing that purchasers
recognize the ornamental matter as an indication of the source of the goods.
Such evidence includes promotion of the ornamental matter as a mark and
survey evidence demonstrating purchaser perception of the matter as a mark.
See In re David Crystal, Inc., 296 F.2d 771 (1961).
22. Pro-Line, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 24 at *4.
23. Id. The Board explained that where an alleged mark serves as part of the
aesthetic ornamentation of goods, the size, location, dominance and significance
of the alleged mark as applied to the goods are all factors that figure
prominently in the determination of whether it also serves as an indication of
source. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *10. The Board found no evidence that the slogan "BLACKER
THE COLLEGE SWEETER THE KNOWLEDGE" was distinctive for any
other goods or services, such that the distinctiveness carried over to use on
collateral products.
2003]
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phrase was source indicative. 26 The Board rejected this argument
on the grounds that the applicant was seeking to register the phrase
"BLACKER THE COLLEGE SWEETER THE KNOWLEDGE"
not "PRO-LINE. ' ' 27 Therefore, the signaling capacity of "PRO-
LINE" was irrelevant. 2' The Board held that the applicant's phrase
was primarily ornamental and, therefore, unregisterable.29
In re Astro Gods3" is another case where the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board addressed the concept of trademark protection
for t-shirt phrases. Here, the Board discussed the functional
requirement as it applied to a hypothetical t-shirt displaying the
phrase "Swallow Your Leader."'" The Board explained that such a
saying would probably not be considered source indicative.
However, the Board recognized that the "ornamentation" of a t-
shirt could be of a special nature that it inherently tells the
purchasing public the secondary source of the t-shirt.32
In its discussion, the Board referred to another hypothetical t-
shirt on which the name "New York University" appeared. The
Board explained that the name, along with an illustration of the
hall of fame, would serve as ornamentation and would also advise
the purchaser that the university was the secondary source of that
shirt.33 According to the Board, matter that serves as part of the
aesthetic ornamentation of goods can still be registered if it also
serves a source indicating function. Ornamental matter can be
source indicative if: (1) it names the secondary source of the
goods; or (2) at the time of its first use as ornamentation, it was
already a recognized trademark of the applicant for services or
other goods.34
26. Id. at *6.
27. Pro-Line, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 24 at *7.
28. Id.
29. Id. at*10.
30. In re Astro-Gods, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 621 (1984).
31. Id. at 623.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing In re Olin Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. 182 (TTAB 1973); In re
Paramount Pictures Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. 1111 (TTAB 1982) and cases cited
therein). Here, the Board held that the applicant's phrase, "ASTRO GODS" and
[Vol. XIII: 123
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2. Protection for Phrases On Other Merchandise
In Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz," the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered the phrase
"DAMN I'M GOOD" as a trademark for jewelry. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendants from infringing this mark by
advertising, distributing or selling goods using the phrase "DAMN
I'M GOOD."36  The court determined that the phrase was not
source indicative and, therefore, failed to function as a trademark.37
The court reasoned that the purchasers of the plaintiffs jewelry
were primarily motivated by the aesthetically pleasing phrase
because the underlying jewelry was rather ordinary.38 The court
clarified "there is no such thing as a property in a trademark except
as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in
connection with which the mark is employed"39 and "the right to a
particular mark grows out of its use (to designate the product of a
particular trader), not its mere adoption."4 ° The court held that
others could freely appropriate the phrase.41
In the aforementioned cases the courts have reinforced the
principles that trademark law was designed to protect.
Fundamental to trademark protection is a mark's source-signaling
design, was not a recognized trademark at the time it was first used
ornamentally on t-shirts. Id. at *7. Furthermore, the applicant had not properly
promoted the phrase in connection with the t-shirts so as to create consumer
recognition of it as a trademark. Id. The Board delineated several factors to be
considered in determining whether an alleged mark that serves as part of the
aesthetic ornamentation of goods also serves as an indication of origin. Id. at
*8. These factors include the size, location, dominance, and significance of the
alleged mark as applied to the goods. Id. After considering these factors, the
Board sided with the Examining Attorney, ruling that the designation "ASTRO
GODS" and design were not likely to be perceived as anything more than part
of the thematic whole of the ornamentation of the applicant's shirts. Id.
35. 514 F. Supp. 1357 (1981).
36. Id. at 1358.
37. Id. at 1363.
38. Id. at 1362.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Astro Gods, 514 F. Supp. at 1363.
2003]
7
Miller: Suing the Osbournes: Intellectual Property Protection for Creativ
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART. &ENT. LAW [Vol. XIII:123
capacity. One of the primary objectives of trademark law is to
avoid consumer confusion in the marketplace.42 If a mark does not
convey source information, there is no consumer confusion to
prevent.
3. Statutory Content Restrictions
Even if a phrase functions as a trademark, protection could still
be denied due to statutory content restrictions. Section 2(a)
precludes the registration of a trademark that "consists of or
comprises... scandalous matter."43  The Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board attempted to set forth the parameters of "scandalous
matter." '  In re Tinseltown, Inc.45 discussed the validity of the
mark "BULLSHIT" for attach& cases, handbags, purses, belts and
wallets. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that the
profane word was scandalous within the meaning of Section 2(a).46
In rejecting the mark, the Board relied on two dictionary
definitions of the term scandalous: (1) "giving offense to the
conscience or moral feelings ... " and (2) "shocking to the sense
of... decency or propriety . . 4. The Board reasoned that even
42. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900.
43. 15 U.S.C.A. §1052.
44. See In re McGinley, 211 U.S.P.Q. 668 (CCPA 1981). The Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board's reviewing court expressed its opinion that section 2(a)
of the Trademark Act does not represent "an attempt to legislate morality, but,
rather a judgment by Congress that such marks not occupy the time, services
and use of funds of the federal government." Id. at 673.
45. 212 U.S.P.Q. 863, 864 (TTAB 1981).
46. Id. at 865. See also Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 USPQ
1635 (TTAB 1988). Here, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board determined
that a design consisting of the silhouette of a defecating dog, as a mark for polo
shirts and t-shirts was scandalous. The Board noted in particular the depiction
of feces as part of the mark.
47. Tinseltown, at 865. These definitions were presented in McGinley, 211
U.S.P.Q. at 673. In McGinley, the court was considering the registerabilty of a
photograph of a man and woman kissing and embracing in a manner appearing
to expose the man's genitalia. After interpreting the meaning of scandalous, the
court held that this photograph fell within its parameters and thus was an
unregisterable mark. Id. at 673.
8
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though profane words may be uttered more freely, this does not
render them any less profane.48
In Old Glory Condom Corp. ," the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board considered whether the use of the American flag as part of
the applicant's mark for condoms was scandalous. The American
flag design appeared as a feature of the applicant's trademark for
condoms but was not present on the condoms themselves." The
examiner refused registration of the mark on the ground that a
majority of the American public would be offended by the use of
American flag imagery to promote products associated with sexual
activity.5 The applicant argued that his design was not meant to
offend but rather to redefine patriotism as including the fight
against sexually transmitted diseases. 2 The Board considered
precedent and acknowledged that marks which were considered
scandalous twenty years ago might now be perceived as
humorous.53 Recognizing that society's attitude changes through
time, the Board held that the "context of contemporary attitudes"
must be considered when determining whether a mark is
scandalous .
48. Tinseltown, at 865. The Board also pointed out that the fact that profane
words may be uttered more freely does not amend the statute by which the
Board must determine registerability.
49. 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (TTAB 1993).
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *4.
53. Id. at *11. The Board reversed the refusal to register because the
applicant's mark was not scandalous within the meaning of section 2(a). The
Board heavily relied on the applicant's serious purpose with which the mark
was employed. The applicant marketed his condoms in packaging that
emphasized his commitment to the sale of high quality condoms as a means of
promoting safer sex and eliminating AIDS. Id. at 17. The Board explained that
a "seriousness of purpose made manifest to purchasers on the packaging for
applicant's goods is a factor to be taken into account in assessing whether the
mark is offensive or shocking." Id. at 18.
54. The Board also explained that the mark's offensiveness should be judged
in the context of the mark's entire use including labels and accompanying
designs. See In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (TTAB 1988). Here, the Board
considered the mark "BIG PECKER BRAND" for t-shirts. The examiner had
2003]
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Marks will also be deemed unregisterable if they identify matter
of a living individual.5 Section 2(c) of the Lanham Act precludes
the registration of marks which "consists of or comprises a name,
portrait or signature identifying a particular living individual
except by his written consent. .". ."" A name is likely to identify
an individual if that person "is so well known that the public
would reasonably assume the connection, or if the individual is
publicly connected with the business in which the mark is used."57
For purposes of Section 2(c), an identifying name can be a full
name, surname, nickname, or other shortened name. 8
B. Copyright Protection
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries."59  This exclusive right was
intended to serve as an incentive for authors to contribute to the
refused registration on the grounds that "pecker" was a vulgar expression for
penis and therefore was offensive to the general public. The Board reversed the
refusal of registration. The Board reasoned that, because the label used the
phrase in conjunction with a design of a bird, it did not offend morality or raise
a scandal.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c).
56. Id.
57. See In re Debbie Sauer, No. 73/822,435, 1993 TTAB Lexis 12. Here, the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board considered the registerability of the mark
"BO BALL." The examiner refused registration under sections 2(a) and 2(c) of
the Lanham Act. Id. at * 1. The refusal under section 2(a) of the Act was based
on the contention that the mark falsely suggested a connection with Bo Jackson.
The refusal under section 2(c) was based on the fact that the mark consisted of a
name identifying Mr. Jackson and thus could not be registered by the applicant
without Mr. Jackson's written consent. Id. The Board affirmed the refusals on
both grounds reasoning that Mr. Jackson's fame in the football and baseball
industry could cause consumers to assume he was connected to the applicant's
goods. Id. at *7. The Board relied on the facts that Mr. Jackson was widely
known by his nickname and had commercially endorsed other products. Id.
58. Id. at *6.
59. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[Vol. XIII: 123
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arts and sciences.6" However, the primary purpose of granting
copyright protection is not to reward the author but, rather, to
secure "the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
of the authors."'" Copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work.
62
The current copyright statute (hereinafter the 1976 Act) became
effective on January 1, 1978.63 Unlike its predecessor, the 1909
Act, the present act does not require an author to undergo all of the
641hformalities in order to receive copyright protection. Under the
60. See MELVIN B. NiMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS
§ 1.03 [A], at 1-66.17 (2002).
61. Id. at 1-66.17 to 1-66.18, n.3 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). ("Creative work is to be encouraged and
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability to literature, music and other arts. The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good").
62. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
556-67 (1985). Copyright may be claimed only in the "expression" of a work of
authorship and not in its "idea." See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986); See also NIMMER, supra note
60, § 2.03[D], at 234. (quoting section 102(b) of the present Copyright Act: "In
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such a work").
63. See MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS
§7.16[A][1], at 7-147 (2002).
64. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 16, at 233-34. Part of the reason
why Congress decided to de-emphasize certain formalities for copyright
protection was in response to the Berne Convention. Berne is an international
copyright treaty, which promotes the view that copyright formalities should not
be required in order to receive protection. Many of the provisions of the 1909
Act were inconsistent with Berne, and would have precluded the U.S. from
adhering to the treaty if we so decided. Additionally, certain real world
consequences made adhering to the formalities overly burdensome for copyright
owners. Authors and artists often lack the financial resources and legal help that
inventors and trademark holders have at their disposal, hence the term "starving
2003]
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1976 Act, a work receives protection from the moment it is
created.65  An author's copyright protection will last throughout
their lifetime plus an additional seventy years. 6 When the period
of copyright protection expires the work becomes part of the
public domain to be enjoyed freely by all.67
Under the 1976 Act, copyright protection is accorded to
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression. "68 Thus three elements must be present for copyright
protection: (1) originality; (2) authorship;69 and (3) fixation.70
Originality is a constitutional requirement and a fundamental
element of authorship.7' To be deemed original, the work must be
independently created by the author and possess a minimal degree
of creativity. 2  The requirement of fixation is met "when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord... is sufficiently
permanent... to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
artist." Uncounseled, they would often lose their rights unintentionally. In
providing protection for authors and artists from the moment of creation, rather
than upon publication and notice, the 1976 Act reduces this risk. Id. at 234.
65. For works created on and after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the
Current Copyright Act, registration is not a condition to obtaining a copyright.
Copyright automatically attaches to a work the moment it is created, which
means "when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time." See
NIMMER, supra note 63, § 7.16[A][1], at 7-147.
66. Previous law granted protection for the life of the author plus an
additional 50 years. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which
provided protection for the author's life plus 70 years, was supported on the
ground that it gave copyright holders an incentive to preserve older works,
particularly motion pictures in need of restoration. Once this term expires, the
work of art becomes part of the public domain. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §
1.05[A][1], at 1-66.24, n.6.2e.
67. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 16, at 232.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
69. An author has been defined as "he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator, maker." See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
58 (1884).
70. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 16 at 243.
71. See NIMMER, supra note 60, § 1.06[A], at 1-66.28.
72. Id.
[Vol. X111: 123
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duration."73 Simply, a work is fixed when it is made permanent in
some form of tangible medium.74
1. Copyrightable Subject Matter
Section 102(a) enumerates the different categories that
constitute "works of authorship."75  Copyrightable subject matter
includes: literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, sound recordings and architectural works.76
"Literary works are works ... expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols ... such as books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards in which
they are embodied."77
Section 102(a)(5) specifically addresses copyright protection for
prints and labels used for articles of merchandise." Copyright
Office Circular No. 46 described a print as an artistic work with or
without accompanying text, published in a periodical or used
separately in connection with the sale or advertisement of an
article or articles of merchandise.79 The Circular distinguished
prints from labels explaining that the latter consists of either
artistic or literary work that is either imprinted on or attached to an
article of merchandise or its container.80 In the event that a label
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
74. See NIMMER, supra note 60, § 1.08[C][2], at 1-66.40 to 1-66.44.
75. Section 102 states, "Works of authorship include the following
categories." Section 101 explains that the term "including" is meant to be
illustrative and not limitative. Thus it is possible that works of authorship not
listed in Section 102 may also constitute copyrightable subject matter. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 102. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §§2.01 to 2.20, at 2-6 to 2-
216 for a more detailed discussion of copyrightable subject matter.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
78. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.08[G][1] at 2-133.
79. Id.
80. The distinction between a print and a label relates to the manner in which
the work is employed in connection with the articles of merchandise. However
a revised circular did not attempt to distinguish between prints and labels. It
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consists solely of text, it might also find protection as a literary
work.8
Unlike trademark law, copyright protection is not predicated on
the content of the writing. In Mitchell Brothers Film Group v.
Cinema Adult Theater,8 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held a work could not be precluded from copyright
protection based on its content. Mitchell remains the prevailing
view83 even though previous courts have held that obscene content
precludes copyright protection. 4 According to Mitchell, Congress
intended that all creative works be accorded protection. The court
reasoned that the public taste would reward creators of useful
works and deny creators of useless works any reward.85 Even
works deemed seditious, libelous, fraudulent or deceptive would
not be denied copyright protection under Mitchell.86
i. Protection for Short Phrases
In Kitchens of Sara Lee Inc., v. Nifty Foods Corp., 87 the United
simply stated that "prints and labels" generally refers to single-page works that
contain copyrightable pictoral matter, text, or both and which are published as
advertising or as labels for goods. Id. at 2-134.
81. "Despite the House Report suggestion that prints or labels used for
articles of merchandise are protectable under the 'pictoral, graphic, and
sculptural works' category, it would appear that textual matter on labels should
be regarded as literary works." See NIMMER supra note 60, § 2.08[G][2], at 2-
135.
82. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979). The court expressly held that obscene
content does not exclude a work from copyright protection because an obscenity
restriction would be antiethical to the promotion of creativity. Id. at 856. The
court reasoned that creativity requires freedom to explore into the gray areas, to
the cutting edge, and even beyond. Id.
83. See NtMMER, supra note 60, § 2.17, at 2-197.
84. See Martinetti v. McGuire, 16 Fed. Cas. 920, No. 9173 (C.C. Cal 1867).
85. See Mitchell, 604 F.2d at 855. See also NIMMER, supra note 60, § 2.17,
at 2-198.
86. Id.
87. 266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959). Here, the plaintiff and defendant both bake
and sell bakery products including chocolate cake, cream cheese cake, pound
cake and coffee cake. Id. at 543. The defendant was accused of copying the
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit delineated
limitations regarding the copyright protection available for textual
matter. The court stated that, "brand names, trade names, slogans
and other short phrases or expressions could not be copyrighted,
even if they are distinctly arranged or printed."88 Several courts
have denied copyright protection for fragmentary words or phrases
due to their lack of creativity.89 In most of these cases, the short
phrase at issue consisted of only one or two words.9" Still, it may
be possible for a short phrase to acquire copyright protection if it
exhibits sufficient creativity. "There appears to be a reciprocal
relationship between creativity and independent effort."'" The
theory is that "short phrases require less effort from the author"
and, therefore, "a greater degree of creativity must be shown in
order to claim copyright protection.
92
Jokes are an example of short phrases that have been held
copyrightable.93 Like all copyrightable works, the joke must be
original and protection is limited to the joke's expression as
drawings of the chocolate cake, cheesecake and pound cake from the plaintiffs
labels. Id. The court entertained arguments that questioned the copyrightability
of pictures of domestic articles of food. Id. at 545. Nonetheless, the court held
that such obvious copying should be discouraged. The court explained that the
plaintiff had put time, creative thought and money into its pictoral
representation of its cakes and for the copying the plaintiff was entitled to
damages. Id.
88. Id. at 544.
89. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 770 F. Supp. 188, 191-92 (S.D.N.Y 1991)
(holding copyright protection does not extend to words and metaphors or an
ordinary phrase in isolation, but, rather protects a sequence of creative
expression); Kanover v. Marks, 91 U.S.P.Q. 370 (S.D.N.Y 1951); Smith v.
Muehlehach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729 (S.D. Mo. 1956); Perma Greetings,
Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 598 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (holding coaster
designs containing phrases such as "Hang in There" are not copyrightable).
90. See NIMMER, supra note 60, § 2.01[B], at 2-16. See Bird v. Parsons, 127
F. Supp. 2d 885 (S.D. Ohio 2000). See Cook v. Robbins, 232 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.
2001).
91. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.01[B], at 2-17.
92. Id.
93. See Jeff Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (1995).
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opposed to its mere idea. " Because the value of a joke often
derives from its idea rather than its expression, its potential for
receiving copyright protection is often limited.95 Still, there have
been instances where an idea was uniquely expressed and,
therefore, accorded a high level of protection. In Foxworthy v.
Custom Tees,96 the plaintiff comedian brought an action against the
defendant t-shirt manufacturer for allegedly infringing his
common-law copyright in the phrase "you might be a redneck"
and his copyrighted redneck jokes.97
The defendants argued that the jokes were not original to the
plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff should be prevented from
claiming authorship.98 The defendants explained that the plaintiff
got the ideas for his jokes from others causing his work to consist
of public domain material authored by many people.99 The United
94. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.13, at 2-178.3.
95. Id. See Allen D. Madison, The Uncopyrightabilty of Jokes, 35 SAN
DtEGo L. REV. 111 (1998).
96. 879 F. Supp. 1200 (1995).
97. The plaintiff, a comedian, was famous for his "you might be a redneck
if... jokes." Id. at 1204. Examples of the plaintiff's jokes include "You might
be a redneck if... your dad walks you to school because you're in the same
grade" and "You might be a redneck if... you've ever financed a tattoo." Id.
The plaintiff sold comedy albums, t-shirts, and calendars all based on his
redneck jokes. Id. In December of 1994, the plaintiff became aware that t-shirts
bearing exact replications of his jokes were being sold in various stores across
the country. Id. The only difference between the plaintiff's jokes and the
replications was the format. Id. The defendants t-shirts phrased the jokes in
reverse order reading "If you've ever financed a tattoo ... you might be a
redneck." Id.
98. Id. at 1217.
99. Id. at 1218. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia explained that the defendant's argument misinterprets the elements of
authorship and originality. Id. An individual can still be the author of an
original work even if that work was based on material that came from the public
domain. Id. Originality and authorship simply require that an author
independently express this material in an original way. Id. To be deemed
original, the work must possess at least a minimal degree of creativity. Id. The
requisite level of creativity is extremely low. The vast majority of works will
possess some kind of creative spark. Id. (citing Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)).
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States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected
the defendant's argument on the ground that it was the plaintiff
who took these ideas and gave them expression." The court
explained that copyright is concerned with the originality of the
expression as opposed to the subject matter.1"' The plaintiffs
motion to enjoin the defendants from further infringement was
granted. 102
2. Infringement
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to "reproduce,
distribute, perform and display the work" as well as the "right to
prepare derivative works based on the underlying protected
work."' °3 If any person exercises one of these exclusive rights
without the authorization of the copyright owner, an infringement
100. Foxworthy, 879 F. Supp. at 1219. The court made reference to the
plaintiff's testimony regarding the difficulty of writing a joke. Id. The plaintiff
explained that the goal is to get the maximum amount of laughter from the
shortest amount of material. Id. Meeting this objective entails constant
fumbling with the wording of a joke. Id. Comedians will debate about which
word to put first and which to put last, getting the wording correct is key to the
success of a joke. Id.
101. Id. The court stressed that ideas are not the substance of copyrights. No
author can ever copyright the ideas or facts he narrates. Id. at 1218. (citing
Feist, 499 U.S. at 344). However, an author is entitled to protect his or her
original expression of these ideas. The plaintiff repeatedly stated that he used
other people's ideas. Still, the plaintiff was the one to put those ideas into his
own words. As such, his expression was copyrightable. Id.
102. Id. at 1220. When a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of either
trademark or copyright infringement, irreparable harm is ordinarily presumed.
Id. at 1219. In balancing the hardships, the court found in favor of the plaintiff.
Id. Forcing the plaintiff to compete with an infringer outweighed the
defendant's inability to sell illegally infringing t-shirts. Id. Public interest was
also found to tip in favor of the plaintiff. Id. The court explained that the
public's interest is served when the law is upheld and enforced. Id. Enforcing
the exclusive rights of authors promotes the constitutionally recognized value of
art and science to the citizens of this country. Id.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 106. For a more detailed discussion of these rights see
NIMMER, supra note 63 §§ 8.02 to 8.20, at 8-27 to 8-283.
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suit may be brought."°  Although registration"' is not required
under the 1976 Act to receive protection, registration remains a
prerequisite for instituting an infringement action. 1
0 6
To establish infringement, the plaintiff must prove two
elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
original elements of the work."0 7 A plaintiff can establish copying
by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work
and that the works are substantially similar.0 8 In the case of
literary works, infringement is not limited to verbatim copying of
the text but also considers whether the part taken was
substantial.0 9 Access to a copyrighted work can be inferred when
104. "The Act's reference to an "action for copyright infringement" extends
to all copyright infringement actions, including counterclaims, even if the only
relief sought is an injunction." See NtMMER, supra note 63, § 7.16[B][l][a], at
7-153. Once registration occurs, a subsequent infringement action may address
infringing acts that occurred after or before registration, provided that the filing
of the infringement action occurs within the term set in the statute of limitations.
Id.
105. To apply for registration, an author must submit three materials to the
copyright office: (1) a completed application form; (2) copies of the work; and
(3) a filing fee of twenty dollars. The submission of copies of the author's work
is not a requirement for copyright protection. However, failure to satisfy the
deposit requirement will result in a fine. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (d).
106. An exception is made for infringements occurring during the first three
months after a work is published if registration is made before the end of the
three months. See 17 U.S.C. § 412. If an applicant has been refused
registration, she can still maintain an infringement action under section 411 (a).
Section 411 (a) allows an action to be brought if "deposit, application and fee
have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has
been refused.
107. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.
108. See Atari, Inc., v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp.,
672 F.2d at 614. "The test of substantial similarity is whether the ordinary
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook them, and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the same."
See Arica Institute, Inc. v. Helen Palmer, 770 F. Supp. 188, 191 (1991).
109. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
Balanced against this principle is the countervailing consideration that copyright
does not protect against the borrowing of abstract ideas. If the only similarity
between the plaintiffs and the defendant's works is an abstract idea, there is
[Vol. XIII: 123140
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the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to view the
plaintiff's work before creating his or her own work."0
C. The Right of Publicity
Judge Jerome Frank coined the term "right of publicity" in the
1953 case Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc."'
Here, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized that in addition to a right of privacy, a man has a right
in the publicity value of his photograph."2  In this case, the
plaintiff entered into a contract with a ball-player providing the
plaintiff with the exclusive right to use the ball-player's
photograph for the sale of chewing gum."3 The ball-player agreed
not to grant any other gum manufacturer the right to use his
photograph for the entire term of the contract.'"' However, the
ball-player subsequently entered into a similar contract with the
defendant."5 The court ruled that the plaintiff had a valid claim
against the defendant if the defendant used the ball-player's
photograph during the term of the plaintiffs contract." 6  In its
analysis, the court recognized the pecuniary value inherent in a
celebrity's image." 7 The court went on to say that this right of
publicity would not be profitable unless it could be made the
subject of an exclusive grant barring all other advertisers from its
use.
1 18
absence of substantial similarity and no infringement has occurred. See MELVIN
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS §13.03[B][2][a], at
13-59 to 13-60 (2002).
110. See Arica, 770 F. Supp. at 191.
111. 202 F.2d 866 (1953).
112. Id. at 868.
113. Id. at 867.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
117. The court said that it was common knowledge that many prominent
persons, especially actors and ball-players, would feel deprived if they did not
receive money for their endorsements. Id.
118. Id.
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1. State Publicity Rights
Over the past fifty years, the right of publicity has become more
pronounced.'19 Currently, most states recognize that a celebrity's
right of publicity has economic value.120 State law determines the
parameters of this property right.' 2' The right of publicity has
many of the same qualities as other forms of personal property,
such as the ability to possess and control the property to the
exclusion of others. 2 2  The right of publicity can also be the
subject of a contract and can be assigned to others. 123 Currently,
fifteen states recognize a postmortem right of publicity.'24
i. New York and California
New York's right of publicity law is unique when compared
with other states. Although the court in Haelan recognized a
common law right of publicity, 125 the court later rejected this
119. The right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest
of celebrities in their identities. The theory is that a celebrity's identity can be
valuable in the promotion of products. Accordingly, the celebrity is entitled to
protect their identity from unauthorized commercial exploitation. See Memphis
Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 217 (1980). The court stated that,
during their lifetime, celebrities have the exclusive right to control and profit
from the commercial use of their name and persona.
120. Under either common law or statute, the right of publicity has been
recognized as the law of twenty-seven states. States which recognize the right
of publicity under common law are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. See J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
28:16, at 28-25 (4th ed. 1996).
121. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, §§ 28:16 to 28:39, at 28-25 to 28-40
for more information about state law sources of right of publicity law.
122. Id.
123. An assignment is an outright sale of the right of publicity conveying all
rights to the assignee. Id. § 28:47, at 28-67.
124. Eleven states recognize this right by statute and four by common law.
Id. § 28:45, at 28-64.
125. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
[Vol. XIII: 123
20
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss1/6
SUING THE OSBOURNES
holding. In 1984, the court held that the right of publicity is
encompassed under the Civil Rights Laws as an aspect of the right
of privacy. 12  Since the right of privacy is exclusively statutory in
New York, the plaintiff cannot claim an independent common law
right of publicity. 27
Conversely, California has taken a more liberal approach to their
right of publicity legislation. Aside from recognizing a common
law right of publicity for living persons, 128 the state also enacted a
statute recognizing a post mortem right of publicity.'
29
Additionally, California has a statute that recognizes a claim for
invasion of appropriation privacy and infringement of the right of
publicity for living persons. 3 °  These additional statutes
supplement common law rights.'3'
126. Stephano v. News Group Publ'n Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 485 (1984).
127. Id. at 174. For a more detailed discussion of New York's right of
publicity law see MCCARTHY, supra note 120, §§ 28:31 to 28:39, at 28-43 to
28-55.
128. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, he
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Bette Midler's
section 3344 claim. Midler's claim involved a Ford television commercial that
used a Midler sound-alike to sing one of her famous songs. Because the voice
used was not Midler's, the court rejected her claim reasoning that the defendants
had not used anything prohibited by the statute. The term likeness refers to a
visual image as opposed to a vocal imitation. Id. at 463. Still, the court
recognized that Midler had stated a claim for violation of her common law right
of publicity because "the defendants ... for their own profit in selling their
product did appropriate part of her identity" by imitating her voice. Id. at 463-
64.
129. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:18, at 28-26 to 28-28.
130. In 1999, the Governor signed into law a package of amendments
bringing about three major changes to the California provisions creating a post
mortem right: (1) the amendments rephrased the statutory exemptions for the
media; (2) the term of post mortem right was extended from 50 years to 70
years; (3) a new provision was added claiming adjudication whenever the acts
creating a claim occurred in California. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, §
28:18, at 28-26.
131. A defendant may still infringe a plaintiff's common law right even
though the indicia the defendant used does not fall within the statutory list. For
a more detailed discussion of California's right of publicity law see MCCARTHY,
supra note 120, §§ 28:18 to 28:30.
2003]
21
Miller: Suing the Osbournes: Intellectual Property Protection for Creativ
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART. & ENT. LA W
2. Infringement
A prima facie case for infringement of the right of publicity
requires that the plaintiff plead and prove two elements. 3 2 First,
the plaintiff must prove the validity of their right.' In order to
satisfy this burden of proof, the plaintiffs own identity must be at
issue or the plaintiff must be an assignee or exclusive licensee of
someone else's right of publicity.' Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate infringement.'35 Infringement is established if the
defendant, without permission, used some aspect of the identity or
persona"' in such a way as to identify the plaintiff.'37
Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's use is
likely to cause damage to the commercial value of their persona. '38
Infringement of the right of publicity is governed by the test of
"identifiability."' 39  When a significant number of people can
identify the person in question from the defendant's unpermitted
commercial use, infringement is triggered. No proof of falsity,
confusion, or deception is required to prove right of publicity
infringement.
132. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:7.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 28:7, at 28-9, n.1.
135. Id. The right of publicity does not require that the appropriation of
identity be accomplished through particular means to be actionable. It is not
important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiffs identity, but
whether the defendant has done so. A rule that limits infringement to only nine
methods of appropriation merely challenges the clever advertiser to come up
with the tenth. Id. § 28:18, at 28-28
136. The term persona is used to refer to the different commercial values
embodied in personal identity. Persona encompasses a name, nickname, voice,
picture, performing style, distinctive costume or character, and other indicia
closely identified with a person. The protected elements of persona may be
limited to name and likeness depending on the statute. See MCCARTHY, supra
note 120, § 28:7, at 28-10.
137. Id.
138. Falsity or deception is not required for right of publicity infringement.
Rather, infringement is triggered if the plaintiff is identifiable from the
defendant's unauthorized use. Id.
139. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:12 at 28-14.
144 [Vol. XHLI 123
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In John W Carson et al. v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets,' 4
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the defendant's phrase identified Carson even though his name,
John W. Carson, or his picture were not used.' 4 ' Here, the
celebrity plaintiff Carson was the host and star of a well-known
television show called "The Tonight Show.' 42 Five nights a week,
starting in 1962, Carson was introduced on each show with the
phrase "Here's Johnny."' 43  Thus the phrase, "Here's Johnny"
came to be associated with Carson by most of the television
viewing public.'44
The defendant was a corporation engaged in the business of
renting and selling "Here's Johnny" portable toilets. 45  The
defendant was aware of the "Here's Johnny" introductory slogan at
the time he formed his corporation. 46 He admitted that he used the
slogan "Here's Johnny" together with the phrase "The World's
Foremost Commodian" to make a good play on words.'47 The
district court's judgment, dismissing Carson's common law right
of publicity claim, was vacated. The court explained that the
district court's conception of the right of publicity was too
narrow. 48 The court held that a celebrity's right of publicity is
invaded whenever his identity is commercially exploited
regardless of whether or not his name or likeness is used. 49
140. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 835. A celebrity's right of publicity is invaded whenever his
identity is appropriated for commercial purposes.
142. Id. at 832.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Carson, 698 F.2d at 833.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 832
148. Id. at 835. The District Court dismissed Carson's common law right of
publicity claim because the defendants had not used Carson's "name or
likeness." In reversing this decision the Sixth Circuit found that the right was
implicated because the defendant had appropriated Carson's identity by using
the phrase "Here's Johnny!" Id. at 835-37.
149. Id. at 837.
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i. 43(a) Claims
Although falsity is not necessary to establish right of publicity
infringement, falsity is required for a 43(a) claim. 50 Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act prohibits false advertising, which makes it an
effective vehicle for alleging claims of false sponsorship and
endorsement. Often the unpermitted use of a celebrity's identity
will suggest a false inference of endorsement or sponsorship and
hence trigger false advertising concerns in addition to infringing
upon the right of publicity. 5'
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ,52 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the
likelihood of confusion analysis to determine whether White could
prevail on her 43(a) claim.'53 The theory behind the likelihood of
confusion analysis is that the public believes that the mark's owner
sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark.'54 In
White, the defendant electronics company ran an advertisement
that depicted a robot dressed in a wig, gown and jewelry
purposefully selected to represent the plaintiff's "Wheel of
Fortune" television persona.'55 The robot was positioned next to a
game Board, and the caption below read "Longest running game
show."'56 White did not consent to this ad nor was she paid for
it.
157
In determining whether the defendants' ad created a likelihood
of confusion as to the endorsement of their product, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied a trademark-type eight-factor
150. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:14, at 28-17.
151. Id.
152. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. The United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted summary judgment to the defendants and White appealed. Id. at 1397.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. Id. at 1402.
154. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (1979).
155. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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analysis considering (1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2)
relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence
of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree
of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and
(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines."'
The court in White clarified that when the mark involves a
celebrity's identity, the first factor, "strength of the mark," refers
to the level of recognition the celebrity enjoys among members of
society.15 Also, in determining intent, the seventh factor, the
relevant question is whether the defendant intended to profit by
confusing consumers. 60 In its application of the first factor, the
court found that White's mark or celebrity identity, was strong. 16'
In considering the defendant's intent, the court found that a jury
could reasonably conclude that beneath the surface humor was
intent to persuade consumers that White had endorsed the
products. '62
The sixth factor, likely degree of purchaser care, was also held
to favor White. The court found that consumers were unlikely to
be cautious in determining who endorsed the VCR making
confusion as to their endorsement greater. 163  Finally, the court
concluded that the eighth factor, likelihood of expansion of the
product lines, favored White because celebrities often partake in
endorsements."' 4 Overall, the court held that White raised a valid
argument concerning a likelihood of confusion as to her
endorsement. '65
158. The eight-factor test was enunciated in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). Because the District Court did not use anyof the
multi-factor tests in determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion,
and because the case involved an appeal from summary judgment, the court
reviewed de novo the district court's determination.
159. White, 971 F.2d at 1400.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1401. The defendants themselves referred to the ad as the Vanna
White ad.
163. White, 971 F.2d at 1400.
164. Id.
165. Id. The court found that the third factor, similarity of the marks, both
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Conversely, the likelihood of confusion analysis resulted in a
different outcome when it was applied to the facts in Diana
Princess of Wales Mem 'l Fund v. Franklin Mint. 166 Here, the
plaintiffs, a fund, the trustees, and an estate, alleged that the
defendant made products with images of Princess Diana that were
similar to those authorized by her memorial fund.'67  Their
argument was that the similar, unauthorized products would create
confusion as to whether Princess Diana's Memorial Fund had
endorsed the defendant's products and consequently would receive
the proceeds.'68
In finding for the defendant on the first factor, "strength of the
mark," the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
relied on the fact that the plaintiffs used a purple crest to signify
authorization of a product.'69 Furthermore, the defendant's use of
Diana's name and likeness did not expressly indicate an
authorization by any organization. 170 Instead, the only message
conveyed was that the profits from the defendant's products would
be donated to a charity that the Princess supported.'71  In
considering the eighth factor, the "degree of purchaser care," '172 the
court concluded that the relative cost of the defendant's
merchandise and the publicity surrounding the Fund, made it more
supported and contradicted a finding of likelihood of confusion. Id. The marks
were similar because all of the aspects of the robot identified White, however,
the figure was clearly a robot and not a human. Actual confusion, the fourth
factor, did not favor White because she presented no evidence of actual
confusion. Id. The fifth factor, marketing channels used, favored White.
Magazines were used as the marketing channels for the robot ad. Id. White had
appeared in the same stance as the robot in numerous magazines. Id.
166. Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. Franklin Mint Co., No. 98-
56822, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 34568 (9th Cir. 1999). The court dismissed the
plaintiffs right of publicity claim because England did not recognize a right of
publicity much less a postmortem right. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id. at *6.
170. Diana, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 34568 at * 6.
171. Id.
172. The degree of purchaser care is synonymous with "the sophistication of
relevant buyers."
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likely that consumers would exercise a greater degree of care in
selecting products.'73
The court also found in favor of the defendant regarding the
sixth factor, the defendant's intent. 174 The court acknowledged that
the defendant may have chosen to market Princess Diana products
to capitalize on her celebrity. However, the court was not
convinced that the defendant tried to suggest endorsement by the
Princess or her estate.'75 Overall, the court found that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct created a
likelihood of confusion. 176
D. Unfair Competition
Though it is clear that unfair competition is a commercial tort, 77
a more comprehensive definition of this term is difficult to find.
Rather than adhering to a bright line rule, the courts often will
consider whether the acts complained of were fair or unfair.' 78
There is no list of conduct that results in a finding of unfair
competition.'79  When Congress passed the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, it expressly considered and rejected the
suggestion that it clarify the ambiguity of "unfair methods of
competition" by enumerating unfair practices. 8 °  Congress
explained that it would be impossible to frame definitions that
173. Id. at *9.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Diana, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 34568 at *11.
177. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:8, at 1-15 (4th ed. 1996).
178. Id. (The meaning of the term unfair competition is fluid and has been
refined on a case-by case basis by lawyers and judges). See McGraw-Hill Book
Co. v. Random House, Inc., 225 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1962).
179. MCCARTHY, supra note 177, § 1:8, at 1-17. Unfair competition is often
cited in complaints that allege trademark infringement. The basis of this cause
of action is the public's confusion as to the source of the goods or services. The
facts used to support a claim for trademark infringement are also used to prove
unfair competition. See Arvelo v. Am. Int'l. Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 95 (1995).
180. MCCARTHY, supra note 177, § 1:8, at 1-17.
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embraced all unfair practices. 8'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated
that "unfair competition is the umbrella for all statutory and
nonstatutory causes of action arising out of business conduct
contrary to honest practice in industrial or commercial matters."' 18 2
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor gave a more narrow definition of the
concept in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc.'83 Her
opinion defined unfair competition as "having its roots in the
common law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting
consumers from confusion as to source." '84  However, Justice
O'Connor's definition has been criticized because source
confusion is not the only type of conduct unfair competition was
intended to prevent.'85 Other activities labeled unfair by the courts
include false advertising, dilution, theft of trade secrets, and
infringement of the right of publicity.'86
Sections 46 to 49 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition specifically address the applicability of the unfair
competition doctrine to the right of publicity.'87 Section 46
provides that "one who appropriates the commercial value of a
person's identity by using, without consent the person's name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject
181. Id. Congress stated that if all known unfair trade practices were
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be necessary to begin all over
again. See H.R. No. 1142, 63d Cong. (1914).
182. See American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d
3 (5th Cir. 1974); Professional Golfers Ass'n v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
514 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1975). See Rehabilitation Specialists v. Koering, 404
N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("Unfair competition is not a tort with
specific elements; it describes a general category of torts which courts recognize
for the protection of commercial interests").
183. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
184. See MCCARTHY, supra note 177, § 1.9, at 1-22 (commenting that
Justice O'Connor's definition falls short of being fully inclusive because it
confines unfair competition too narrowly to cases of confusion as to source).
185. Id.
186. See MCCARTHY, supra note 177, §1:10, at 1-23 to 1-24 (providing a
more comprehensive list of practices where the courts have found unfair
competition).
187. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § §46-49 (1993).
150 [Vol. XIII: 123
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to liability for the relief appropriate." '188 The Restatement clarifies
that a person's identity is used for trade purposes when the "name,
likeness or other indicia of a person's identity ... are used in
advertising the user's goods or services, placed on merchandise
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services
rendered by the user."'89  The Restatement sets forth certain
exceptions to liability, which includes using a celebrity's identity
for purposes of news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works
of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such
uses.
190
E. Subject Opinion
On May 28, 2002, T-Shirt Hell filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
complaint alleged that the defendants, John ("Ozzy") and Sharon
Osbourne (Osbournes), as well as several businesses, infringed the
company's original trademark, "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M
MOVING IN WITH THE OSBOURNES."' 9' T-Shirt Hell
claimed that the defendants, Epic Records and Sony
Entertainment, Inc., sent an e-mail requesting five hundred dollars
worth of t-shirts displaying the above-mentioned phrase. 9 2 Forty
t-shirts were sent to the defendants three days after the order was
placed.'93  Approximately two months later, the Osbournes
allegedly authorized the manufacture, distribution, and sale of t-
shirts bearing a similar phrase. The t-shirt authorized by the
Osbournes reads, "Fuck my family ... I'm moving in with the
Osbourne family." "' The Osboumes also authorized a censored
version of the t-shirt.1 95
188. Id. §46.
189. Id.
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §47 (1993).
191. See T-Shirt Hell, No. 02 CV 4026 at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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T-Shirt Hell claimed to have notified the defendants of the
infringing activity to no avail.'96 T-Shirt Hell argued that the
continued infringement has amounted to unfair competition and
irreparable damage.'97 The company seeks an injunction against
the defendants to prevent them from further infringement.'98 T-
Shirt Hell also requested damages in the form of attorney's fees
and lost profits in the amount of fifteen million dollars."'
Currently, no answer has been filed.20 °
III ANALYSIS
This section will consider the merit of T-Shirt Hell's trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims against the
Osbournes. 2°' First, the validity of T-Shirt Hell's phrase, "FUCK
MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE OSBOURNES," will
be evaluated under trademark law. Essentially, this analysis will
highlight the shortcomings of T-Shirt Hell's phrase in terms of its
ability to function as a trademark. Second, copyright law will be
proposed as a more plausible form of protection for T-Shirt Hell's
phrase. 22  Here, the company's phrase will be considered to
determine whether it is capable of acquiring copyright protection
according to various procedural and statutory requirements.
Third, T-Shirt Hell's claim of unfair competition will be
evaluated.2 3 The defendants' activities, alleged to be unfair, will
be evaluated in light of the Osbournes' publicity rights. This
analysis will lead into the final topic of discussion, which is the
problem with seeking protection for a phrase that serves to exploit
196. Id.
197. See T-Shirt Hell, No. 02 CV 4026 at 3.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. As of February 24, 2003, a complaint, an amended complaint and
various stipulations were the only documents on record for this case.
201. See infra notes 205-265 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 205-218 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 245-249 and accompanying text.
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the Osbournes' identity.2°  Here, possible right of publicity
counterclaims available to the Osbournes will be discussed.
Overall, this analysis will address whether the Osbournes' right to
protect their persona would trump any intellectual property right
T-Shirt Hell might possess.
A. T-Shirt Hell's Trademark Infringement Claim
In their complaint, T-Shirt Hell claimed that it created the
original trademark, "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN
WITH THE OSBOURNES" to be displayed on t-shirts .2 " The
complaint alleged that the defendants' licensing, printing,
distribution, and sale of goods displaying a similar slogan, "Fuck
my family! I'm moving in with.., the Osbourne family,"
infringed their trademark.26 Because T-Shirt Hell's phrase has not
been registered, it must be demonstrated that the slogan is entitled
to trademark protection for an infringement claim to survive.
1. T-Shirt Hell's Phrase Fails To Function As A Source Indicator
Fundamental to trademark protection is the mark's source-
signaling capacity. 27 A critical element in determining whether a
term functions as a trademark is the impression that the term
makes on the relevant public. 28 To function as a trademark, the
phrase "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE
OSBOURNES" would have to convey that T-Shirt Hell is the
source of the t-shirt. 219 Although most of T-Shirt Hell's shirts tend
to be offensive in nature, this alone would not make the
aforementioned phrase source indicative. Other companies have
produced similar offensive t-shirts. Consequently, a court would
204. See infra notes 250-265 and accompanying text.
205. See T-Shirt Hell, No. 02 CV 4026, at 2.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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likely categorize T-Shirt Hell's phrase as mere ornamentation.
2. T-Shirt Hell's Phrase Is Purely Ornamental
Courts have allowed the registration of ornamental matter if it
serves a source indicating function. Ornamental matter can be
source indicative if: (1) it names the secondary source of the
goods; or (2) at the time of its first use as ornamentation, it was
already a recognized trademark of the applicant for services or
other goods.2 1' T-Shirt Hell's phrase is unlikely to satisfy either of
these requirements. First, the phrase does not name the source of
the t-shirt. Second, prior to its first use in March of 2002, the
phrase had not been used on other goods.1 2
A court is likely to draw a comparison between T-Shirt Hell's
phrase and others that have been deemed merely aesthetically
pleasing and ornamental.213 A court could find that purchasers of
T-Shirt Hell's clothing are primarily motivated by the funny
phrases on the shirts rather than the quality of the good. When a
consumer buys a shirt with the phrase "Bin Laden is a big fat
doodiehead" printed on the front, it would be difficult to argue that
shirt's fiber count was what ultimately persuaded the buyer. It is
more probable that the consumer was motivated to purchase the
shirt because of its humorous political statement. The same logic
can be applied to the phrase at issue "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M
MOVING IN WITH THE OSBOURNES." Similarly, the
prospective purchaser of this shirt is more likely to buy it because
of the statement rather than the shirt's durability.
T-Shirt Hell's phrase fails to function as a trademark because it
does not clearly communicate that T-Shirt Hell is the source of the
shirt. Trademark law is designed to prevent consumer confusion
in the marketplace. A trademark is the owner's way of preventing
210. When a saying or slogan does not serve as a source indicator, a court is
likely to categorize the phrase as mere ornamentation. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
212. See T-Shirt Hell, No. 02 CV 4026, at 2.
213. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
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others from tricking consumers into buying a product they
mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark owner. 214
However, when there is no source identification, there is no
confusion to prevent. Consequently, T-Shirt Hell would be
unsuccessful in receiving trademark protection for its phrase. 2'5
3. T-Shirt Hell's Phrase Is Scandalous And Identifies A L iving
Individual
Even assuming that T-Shirt Hell could establish that its slogan
was source-indicative the phrase could still be denied protection on
the ground that it is scandalous. In re Tinseltown suggests that
profanity is likely to be declared scandalous matter.2t6 T-Shirt
Hell's phrase contains the word "FUCK" which could present
considerable problems under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.217
Additionally, T-Shirt Hell's phrase could be precluded because
it identifies a living individual. A name is likely to identify an
individual if that person is "so well known that the public would
reasonably assume the connection, or if the individual is publicly
connected with the business in which the mark is used. 21 8 The
Osbournes are widely known to the American television viewing
public. The context of the phrase, which makes reference to the
show, makes it even more likely that the name serves to identify
the living individuals. Furthermore, the Osbournes have endorsed
a variety of merchandise including t-shirts. These similar
endorsements increase the likelihood that the public would assume
a connection between the celebrity family and the T-Shirt Hell
shirt. For the reasons articulated above, T-Shirt Hell would not be
persuasive in arguing that its phrase is entitled to trademark
protection.
214. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305.
215. The right to a particular mark stems from its ability to designate the
product of a particular trader. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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B. Copyright: A Better Fit For T-Shirt Hell
A more effective approach would be for T-Shirt Hell to base
their complaint on copyright infringement. To establish
infringement, T-Shirt Hell must prove two elements: (1) ownership
of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of original elements of the
work." 9 T-Shirt Hell could easily establish the second element. A
plaintiff can establish copying by showing that the defendant had
access to the plaintiffs work and that the works are substantially
similar.2" T-Shirt Hell can demonstrate the defendants' access to
the work by submitting the online order placed by the defendants'
for five hundred dollars worth of the shirts. Substantial similarity
can also be established. The defendants' phrase "Fuck my
family... I'm moving in with the Osbourne family" is virtually
identical to T-Shirt Hell's "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING
IN WITH THE OSBOURNES. 221  Proving the first element of
infringement, ownership of a valid copyright, would be more
difficult for T-Shirt Hell.
1. T-Shirt Hell Must Establish Ownership Of A Valid Copyright
The 1976 Act provides copyright protection for "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.5
222
Thus, three elements must be present for copyright protection: (1)
originality; (2) authorship; 223 and (3) fixation. 224 According to T-
Shirt Hell's complaint, the company invented the phrase "FUCK
MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE OSBOURNES"
219. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
220. See Atari, 672 F.2d at 614.
221. In the case of literary works, infringement is not limited to verbatim
copying of the text but also considers whether the part taken was substantial.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
223. An author has been defined as "he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator, maker." See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
224. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 16, at 243.
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prior to March 15, 2002.225 If this allegation were corroborated, it
would establish that T-Shirt Hell independently created the phrase,
thereby satisfying the second element of authorship. The third
element of fixation is straightforward and is easily satisfied here.
Fixation exists "when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord... is sufficiently permanent... to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration. '26  Here, T-Shirt Hell's phrase is
unquestionably fixed by means of the t-shirts.
The first element, originality, could present an obstacle for T-
Shirt Hell's phrase. Normally, to be deemed original, the work
must be independently created by the author and possess a minimal
degree of creativity. 227 As discussed above, independent creation
is not a problem here. However, satisfying the requisite level of
creativity could present problems for T-Shirt Hell. Normally, a
work need only exhibit a minimal degree of creativity for
copyright protection. Conversely, the standard is much higher
when the phrase is short. 228  The theory is that "short phrases
require less effort from the author" and, therefore, "a greater
degree of creativity must be shown in order to claim copyright
protection. 29
Several courts have denied copyright protection for fragmentary
words or phrases due to their lack of creativity.23 ° In most of these
225. See T-Shirt Hell, No. 02 CV 4026 at 2.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
227. See NIMMER, supra note 60, § 1.06[A], at 1-66.28.
228. See Sara Lee, 266 F.2d at 544. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit stated that brand names, trade names, slogans and other short
phrases or expressions cannot be copyrighted, even if they are distinctly
arranged or printed. Id. The court explained that the copyright office does not
believe in registering familiar symbols or designs, mere variations of
typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring, and mere listing of ingredients
or contents. Id. The court conceded that the publication of these views does not
have the force of a statute but nonetheless represents a fair summary of the law.
Id.
229. There appears to be a reciprocal relationship between creativity and
independent effort. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.01 [B], at 2-17.
230. Arica, 770 F. Supp. 188, at 191-192 (stating copyright protection does
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cases the short phrase at issue consisted of only one or two
words. 3 Still, it may be possible for a short phrase to acquire
copyright protection if it exhibits sufficient creativity. Jokes,
although usually short, have been found to be sufficiently creative
in some instances.
2. T-Shirt Hell 's Phrase Could Constitute A Joke
In Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, 232 the plaintiff comedian brought
an action against the defendant t-shirt manufacturer for allegedly
infringing his common-law copyright in the phrase "you might be
a redneck" and his copyrighted redneck jokes. The plaintiff
explained that the goal in creating a joke is to get the maximum
amount of laughter from the shortest amount of material.233
Meeting this objective entails constant fumbling with the wording
of a joke.3 Comedians will debate about which word to put first
and which to put last. According to the plaintiffs testimony,
getting the wording correct is key to the success of a joke.235
T-Shirt Hell could try to argue that its phrase exhibits sufficient
creativity because it achieves the objective of producing the most
amount of laughter from the shortest amount of material. Like the
plaintiff in Foxworthy, T-Shirt Hell would emphasize the effort
that creating a successful joke entails. To bolster its creativity
argument, T-Shirt Hell could point to the fact that others, namely
the defendants, have copied the phrase.
Although the creativity of a joke is often inherent, jokes remain
susceptible to arguments that the expression of the joke has
not extend to words and metaphors or ordinary phrases in isolation but, rather,
protects a sequence of creative expression.); Kanover, 91 U.S.P.Q. at 370;
Smith, 140 F. Supp. at 729; Perma, 598 F. Supp. at 445 (denying copyright
protection for coaster designs containing phrases such as "Hang in There"
reasoning that words are not copyrightable).
231. See Bird v. Parsons, 127 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2000). See
Cook v. Robbins, 232 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2001).
232. 879 F. Supp. 1200 (1995)
233. Id. at 1218.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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merged with its idea. Since, copyright law protects expression and
not ideas,236 a merging of the two can be fatal to the joke's
copyrightability. Here, the Osbournes could argue that the value
of the phrase "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH
THE OSBOURNES" derives from its idea rather than expression.
In support, the Osbournes could argue that their show, "The
Osbournes," is one of the most popular shows on television. The
popularity of this show is mainly predicated on the ridiculous
lifestyle that the family leads. Therefore, the thought of
abandoning one's own family and moving in with the Osbournes is
not unique. Essentially, the Osbournes would try to portray T-
Shirt Hell's phrase as one that has become part of the public
domain. However, such an argument could prove unsuccessful as
it did in Foxworthy.237
In Foxworthy, the copyrightability of the plaintiffs redneck
jokes was upheld because the plaintiff took those ideas and gave
them expression.238 Therefore, the fact that the plaintiffs ideas for
his jokes came from the public domain was irrelevant.239 The
plaintiffs motion to enjoin the defendants from further
infringement was granted.24 ° Similarly, T-Shirt Hell could argue
that their company took the idea of shacking up with the
Osbournes and gave it expression. Using the same argument as
the plaintiff in Foxworthy, T-Shirt Hell would reiterate that the
proper ordering of the words is crucial to a joke's success.4 T-
Shirt Hell's phrase, like the redneck jokes in Foxworthy, could
have value as an expression separate from its idea. As such, the
phrase might be entitled to copyright protection as a joke.
Copyright law would provide a stronger basis for seeking relief
from the defendants.242 Unfortunately, T-Shirt Hell did not even
236. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.13, at 2-178.3.
237. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
242. Also favoring T-Shirt Hell is the fact that content restrictions do not
exist under copyright law. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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mention copyright infringement in their complaint. 43 Instead, T-
Shirt Hell improperly relied on the law of unfair competition as an
additional form of redress.24
C. T-Shirt Hell's Unfair Competition Claim
It is apparent from their complaint that T-Shirt Hell was
attempting to use trademark infringement as a basis for claiming
unfair competition. 245 However, T-Shirt Hell is unlikely to prevail
on either of these claims when considering the facts alleged in
their complaint. As discussed earlier, T-Shirt Hell's phrase is
unlikely to qualify for trademark protection. 246  Therefore, the
defendant's activities, no matter how unsavory, would not be
characterized as trademark infringement or unfair competition on
this ground.247
No clear rule has been articulated concerning the conduct that
According to Mitchell, Congress intended that all creative works be accorded
protection, reasoning that the public taste would reward creators of useful works
and deny creators of useless works any reward. As discussed earlier, T-Shirt
Hell's phrase would be problematic under trademark law because it contains the
word "Fuck." See supra notes 216-217 and accompanying text. The phrase
could be precluded, as scandalous matter, under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.
See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. Because the phrase identifies
living individuals, the Osbournes, it might also face considerable barriers under
section 2(c) of the Lanham Act. See supra notes and 55-58 and accompanying
text. Lack of content restrictions makes copyright law a more plausible method
of protection for T-Shirt Hell's phrase.
243. See T-Shirt Hell, No. 02 CV 4026.
244. Id.
245. Id. Courts have recognized that the same facts used to establish
trademark infringement might also be used to show unfair competition. See
MCCARTHY, supra note177, §1:8, at 1-17.
246. See supra notes 211-224 and accompanying text.
247. Alternatively, the court could employ the narrower definition of unfair
competition articulated in the Bonito Boats decision. See supra notes 183-184.
In this situation, T-Shirt Hell would be unsuccessful since its phrase is not
source indicative and consequently is not susceptible to confusion in the
marketplace.
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results in a finding of unfair competition.248 In evaluating an unfair
competition claim, the court might simply consider whether the
acts complained of were fair or unfair.249 If fairness is the standard
of review, T-Shirt Hell could try to convince the court that the
defendants' shirt, which bears a nearly identical phrase, has
amounted to unfair competition. Blatant copying, under normal
circumstances, could be considered an unfair trade practice. Yet
this case presents an unusual scenario because of the defendants'
personal ties to the phrase at issue.
The phrase "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH
THE OSBOURNES" clearly implicates the celebrity Osboume
family. The fact that the phrase identifies celebrities brings forth a
whole host of issues that would not come into play in a typical
infringement/unfair competition claim. Because the Osboume
name was appropriated without consent, a court would probably be
less sympathetic towards T-Shirt Hell. In fact, a court may be
more willing to entertain unfair competition put forth by the
Osbournes.
D. The Osbournes' Rights of Publicity And Unfair Competition
Counterclaims
Infringement of the right of publicity is a commercial tort and
also a form of unfair competition. 2" Based on the facts of this
case, T-Shirt Hell is likely to receive counterclaims for invasion of
the Osbournes' right of publicity and unfair competition. Section
46 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides that
"one who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity
by using, without consent the person's name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for
248. Id.
249. See McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random House, Inc., 225 N.Y.S.2d 646
(1962). See MCCARTHY, supra note 177, § 1.8 , at 1-17. (The meaning of the
term unfair competition is fluid and has been refined on a case-by-case basis by
lawyers and judges).
250. Id.
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the relief appropriate. 251
T-Shirt Hell used the Osbourne name for purposes of trade
without their consent. To make a prima facie case for
infringement, the Osbournes must establish two elements. First,
the Osbournes must prove the validity of their right by arguing that
their own identity is at issue.252 Second, the Osbournes must
demonstrate infringement. Infringement is established if the
defendant, without permission, used some aspect of the identity or
persona 25 3  in such a way as to identify the plaintiff. 254
Additionally, the Osbournes must show that T-Shirt Hell's use is
likely to cause damage to the commercial value of their persona.255
Infringement of the right of publicity is governed by the test of
"identifiability. ' 256 If a significant number of people could identify
the Osbournes from T-Shirt Hell's unpermitted commercial use,
infringement would be triggered. No proof of falsity, confusion,
or deception is required to prove right of publicity infringement.
251. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §46 (1993). The
Restatement clarifies that a person's identity is used for trade purposes when the
"name, likeness or other indicia of a person's identity... are used in advertising
the user's goods or services, placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or are
used in connection with services rendered by the user."
252. The plaintiff's own identity must be at issue or the plaintiff must be an
assignee or exclusive licensee of someone else's right of publicity. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:7, at 28-9, n.l.
253. The term persona is used refer to the different commercial values
embodied in personal identity. Persona encompasses a name, nickname, voice,
picture, performing style, distinctive costume or character, and other indicia
closely identified with a person. The protected elements of persona may be
limited to name and likeness depending on the statute. See MCCARTHY, supra
note 120, § 28:7, at 28-10.
254. Id.
255. Id. Falsity or deception is not required to prove infringement of the
right of publicity. Rather, infringement is triggered if the plaintiff is identifiable
from the defendant's unauthorized use. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, §
28:12, at 28-14.
256. Id.
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1. T-Shirt Hell's Phrase Identifies the Osbournes
It should not be difficult to establish that T-Shirt Hell's phrase
identifies the Osbournes. The phrase explicitly uses the Osbourne
name in a context that is highly recognizable to the television-
viewing public. 57  The phrase "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M
MOVING IN WITH THE OSBOURNES" obviously caters to
those familiar with the reality-based television show. The
Osbournes could also argue that T-Shirt Hell's use of their persona
caused damage to its commercial value. One way the Osbournes
could show damage, although somewhat ironic, is to reference T-
Shirt Hell's complaint. Here, the Osbournes attempted to
capitalize on their own success by authorizing the manufacture and
distribution of t-shirts bearing the phrase "Fuck my family! I'm
moving in with... the Osbourne Family." Yet, it is this conduct
that T-Shirt Hell argues was inequitable. Finding in favor of T-
Shirt Hell would deprive the Osbournes of their rights to profit off
of their own labor.258 The Osbournes might also argue that T-Shirt
Hell's exploitation of their persona made their own products less
profitable.
2. The Osbournes' 43(a) Claim
Although falsity is not necessary to establish right of publicity
infringement, falsity is required for a 43(a) claim.259 Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act prohibits false advertising, which makes it an
effective vehicle for alleging claims of false sponsorship and
endorsement. Often the unpermitted use of a celebrity's identity
will suggest a false inference of endorsement or sponsorship and
hence trigger false advertising concerns in addition to infringing
257. Infringement is established if the defendant, without permission, has
used some aspect of identity or persona in such a way that it identifies the
plaintiff. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:7, at 28.10.
258. The right of publicity serves to protect against attempts to utilize
another's investment. See DREYFUSS & KWALL, supra note 16, at 519.
259. See MCCARTHY, supra note 120, § 28:14, at 28-17.
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upon the right of publicity.2 16
The 43(a) analysis is more stringent because it requires the
celebrity to prove that the defendant's appropriation created a
likelihood of confusion regarding endorsement. T-Shirt Hell
would probably argue that there is no confusion as to sponsorship
because their t-shirts are sold from their own web site
tshirthell.com. Consequently, the source of the t-shirt is obvious.
Still, the Osboumes could defeat T-Shirt Hell's argument if the
eight-factor balancing test were to tip in their favor.26'
Looking at the first factor, "strength of the mark," a court is
likely to find that the Osboumes' celebrity status is strong. 262 "The
Osbournes" is a very successful television show. As a result, each
of the family members has become a star in their own right. The
family members have regularly appeared on magazine covers, talk
shows, award shows and other highly publicized events. Also
favoring the Osboumes is the eighth factor, the "sophistication of
the relevant buyers." Because T-Shirt Hell's shirts cost only
twenty-two dollars each, consumers may not be as cautious in
determining sponsorship.263 Here, the strength of the Osbourne
mark and the lack of purchaser care make source confusion more
probable.
Conversely, the sixth factor, the defendant's intent, probably
260. Id.
261. The court would use this test to determine whether the defendant's use
of the Osbourne name created confusion as to the endorsement of the t-shirts.
This analysis should not be confused with the test used to determine source
confusion in trademark infringement actions. Although the tests are very
similar, trademark infringement would have required a comparison of T-Shirt
Hell's phrase and the Osbournes' phrase. Such a comparison is unnecessary
here because T-Shirt Hell's phrase does not function as a trademark. See supra
notes 207-218 and accompanying text.
262. When the mark involves a celebrity's identity the first factor, "strength
of the mark," refers to the level of recognition the celebrity enjoys among
members of society. See White, 971 F.2d at 1400.
263. In determining the level of caution buyers are likely to exercise, the
court has considered the cost of the product at issue. The theory behind this
inquiry is that buyers will be more cautious when the item they are purchasing is
expensive. See Diana, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 34568 at *9.
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weighs against a finding of confusion.2" T-Shirt Hell probably did
not intend to persuade consumers that the Osbournes had
sponsored their shirt. T-Shirt Hell sells their shirts at their own
web site tshirthell.com. The outcome might be different if the
shirts were sold at Mtv.com because of the Osbournes' strong
affiliation with MTV. Fortunately for the Osbournes, there is
another factor that favors a finding of confusion. Because
celebrities often partake in endorsements, and the Osbournes
actually have endorsed a similar shirt, the fourth factor, likelihood
of expansion of the product lines weighs in favor of the
Osbournes. Thus, it is possible for the Osbournes to prevail on a
43(a) claim for false sponsorship or endorsement.265
IV. IMPACT
The T-Shirt Hell case is noteworthy for many reasons. First, it
is rare to see a celebrity sued for using his own name. This case is
particularly odd because T-Shirt Hell has no contract that entitles
them to use the Osbournes' name or persona. T-Shirt Hell
appropriated the Osbourne name without consent, yet still had the
audacity to sue the Osbournes so as to prevent them from using
their own name in a similar fashion. This case is also unique
because it allows for a discussion of a wide range of intellectual
property doctrines, which normally would not come into play in a
single case.
On a theoretical level, this case is interesting because it presents
an equitable predicament. Here, we have a plaintiff who
independently came up with a creative phrase that the defendants
264. In determining intent, the relevant question is whether the defendant
intended to profit by confusing consumers. Id. at *9-10.
265. The Restatement sets forth some exceptions to liability including the use
of a celebrity's identity for purposes of news reporting, commentary,
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental
to such use. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1993).
T-Shirt Hell could try to characterize its use of the Osbourne name as
commentary. However, the highly commercial nature of T-Shirt Hell's
appropriation would probably weigh against such a finding.
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blatantly copied. On the other hand, we have the defendant
Osbournes whose fame and commercially valuable persona have
been exploited by the plaintiff without their consent. The irony of
the T-Shirt Hell case makes it an interesting topic of debate.
However, the T-Shirt Hell case is noteworthy for another, more
important, reason. The T-Shirt Hell case draws attention to the
problems inherent in protecting creative merchandise. To an
extent, one can sympathize with companies like T-Shirt Hell who
have invested considerable time and energy creating profitable
merchandise. It seems there should be some way to protect these
lucrative t-shirt phrases from the blatant copying and unjust
enrichment of others. Still, much uncertainty exists regarding the
protectability of creative merchandise. One of the primary reasons
for this uncertainty is that creative merchandise and t-shirt phrases
do not clearly fall within a specific area of intellectual property.
As will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow, trademark
law is a poor fit for creative merchandise. Although copyright law
appears more suitable, little precedent exists in this area.
However, it is clear that creative merchandise that derives its value
from a celebrity's fame, is at risk under right of publicity law.
Right of publicity laws can preclude protection for exploitative
merchandise as well as hold the creator liable for damages to the
commercial value of the celebrity's persona.
A. Trademark Law: A Poor Fit For Creative Merchandise
It is unlikely that creative phrases placed on merchandise will
ever qualify for trademark protection.266  The t-shirt cases
discussed in section II of this article illustrate the courts'
266. The creative phrases at issue here should be distinguished from brand
names displayed on merchandise. Brand names placed on merchandise will
often qualify for trademark protection if they have source signaling capacity. A
brand name is more likely to effectively communicate information about a
product or service's nature and/or quality. Conversely, the aesthetically
pleasing text imprinted on the front of a t-shirt, coffee cup, hat or other item of
merchandise, does not function in this manner, presenting considerable
problems under trademark law. See supra notes 19-58 and accompanying text.
166 [Vol. XIII: 123
44
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss1/6
SUING THE OSBOURNES
unwillingness to allow trademark protection for creative t-shirt
phrases.267 The courts flat out rejected trademark protection for
catchy phrases like "BLACKER THE COLLEGE THE
SWEETER THE KNOWLEDGE" and "SWALLOW YOUR
LEADER. ' 268 In both cases, the court reasoned that such phrases
are purely ornamental.269 In other words, the purchaser ultimately
buys the t-shirt because he or she likes the phrase imprinted on
it.27° Though these cases explicitly discuss the protectability of t-
shirt phrases, the courts' holdings are applicable to slogans on all
forms of merchandise. In essence, trademark protection will
ultimately depend upon the message that the phrase conveys. 271
To illustrate, consider the T-Shirt Hell phrase "Anna Nicole Ate
My Little Brother 272 imprinted on a t-shirt. This phrase conveys
nothing about the t-shirt's fiber count, fit or durability. Similarly,
the phrase printed on a coffee mug does not indicate whether the
cup is breakable, microwave-safe or handmade. Rather, the
statement "Anna Nicole Ate My Little Brother" simply conveys a
humorous message. It is the humorous nature of this expression
that probably persuades the consumer to choose that t-shirt or
coffee cup over another. As such, the phrase would not function
as a trademark but instead, as aesthetically pleasing
ornamentation.2 73
The trademark cases clearly indicate that "there is no such thing
as a property in trademark except as a right appurtenant to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed. ' 274 Simply, the right to a particular mark stems from its
ability to designate the product of a particular trader as opposed its
267. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
272. "Anna Nicole Ate My Little Brother" is the subject of a t-shirt sold at T-
Shirt Hell's web site, available at http://www.tshirthell.com (last visited Feb.
24, 2003).
273. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
274. See Damn I'm Good, 514 F. Supp. at 1362.
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mere adoption.275 It is unlikely that the creative phrases at issue
will ever serve to designate the product of a particular trader. Thus
trademark law proves to be a poor fit for protecting creative
merchandise.
B. Copyright: A More Plausible Form Of Protection
Copyright law is more conducive to protecting lucrative phrases.
To qualify for copyright protection the phrase at issue must be an
original work of authorship that is fixed in a tangible medium. 76
The inventor of the phrase would need to prove that he or she
independently created the expression and that the work has been
fixed. Because these phrases are affixed to articles of
merchandise, the fixation requirement is easily satisfied.277  The
authorship and fixation requirements do not present unreasonable
challenges for the author. However, satisfying the requisite level
of originality could present an obstacle for short phrases.278
Under normal circumstances, a work of authorship need only
possess a minimal degree of creativity to be deemed original.279
However, the standard for short phrases is more substantial
requiring a higher level of creativity.2 0  Courts have denied
copyright protection for phrases that consist of one or two words,
repeatedly citing lack of creativity.' The theory is that short
phrases require less effort from the author. Thus a greater degree
of creativity must be shown in order to claim copyright
282protection.
Most phrases printed on merchandise are relatively short
275. Id.
276. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
278. Since short phrases require less effort from the author, a greater degree
of creativity must be shown in order to claim copyright protection. See
NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.01[B], at 2-16 to 2-17.
279. Id. § 1.06[A], at 1-66.28.
280. Id § 2.01[B], at 2-16 to 2-17.
281. Id. at 2-16.
282. Id. at2-17.
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consisting of, at most, a few sentences. The short length of the
work weighs against a finding of sufficient creativity. Still,
copyright protection for lucrative phrases is not totally out of the
question. According to precedent, jokes have been held
copyrightable in some instances. 283 The court has recognized the
creative efforts involved in writing a successful joke. In creating a
joke the goal is to get the maximum amount of laughter from the
shortest amount of material. To achieve this objective the author
must come up with the proper wording.
Often, a short phrase, taken alone, will lack the requisite
creativity for copyright protection. 284 If the phrase, by itself, is
insufficiently creative, the author could enhance the originality by
including other creative attributes. The merchandise designer
could attempt to copyright the t-shirt or article of merchandise as a
whole.285 The author may have a better chance of demonstrating
sufficient creativity by pointing to the unique font, color and
arrangement of the phrase as it is displayed on the particular article
of merchandise.286
Still, copyright protection for these types of phrases is
uncommon. Instead some t-shirt authors and merchandise
designers have improperly relied on the more familiar trademark
law as T-Shirt Hell did. Lack of precedent may be due to the high
standard of creativity required for short phrases. Another reason
may be that becatise trademarks are often displayed on articles of
merchandise, copyright is overlooked. However, mere aesthetic
phrases will never acquire trademark status. Despite the lack of
precedent, copyright is a more plausible form of protection for
creative merchandise.287
283. See Foxworthy, 879 F. Supp. at 1200.
284. There appears to be a reciprocal relationship between creativity and
independent effort. See NIMMER, supra note 60, §2.01 [B], at 2-17.
285. This does not mean that a copyright should be sought for the functional
features of the product but rather, for the design as a whole.
286. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
287. See supra notes 219-231 and accompanying text.
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C. Right of Publicity Issues
As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, the majority of
T-Shirt Hell's shirt phrases derive their humor from celebrity
mockery including "Anna Nicole ate my little brother .... Brittany
is a whore, .... Bin Laden is a big fat doodiehead," and the infamous
phrase "FUCK MY FAMILY I'M MOVING IN WITH THE
OSBOURNES." When considering the merchandise on the
current market, the exploitation of famous personas is not unique
to T-Shirt Hell. T-Shirts, coffee mugs, hats, posters and other
items will often depict celebrity images or make reference to a
famous name or persona. When the celebrity has not consented to
the appropriation, right of publicity laws could present serious
obstacles for the companies and individuals who create the
merchandise.
As analyzed in Section III of this Article, celebrities have
publicity rights. State law determines the scope of these rights
and, although they may differ, most states recognize the economic
value of a celebrity's right of publicity. If the author invents a
profitable phrase that derives its value from the celebrity's image,
they could be liable for any damage to the commercial value of
that celebrity's persona.288
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, companies like T-Shirt Hell will likely face
considerable boundaries to protecting their creative merchandise.
Lucrative phrases affixed to merchandise are unlikely to qualify as
trademarks. Most often these phrases are merely aesthetic and
ornamental. Consequently, such phrases fail to function as source
indicators and are not eligible for trademark protection.
Creative merchandise has a better chance of acquiring protection
under copyright law. Most phrases will easily satisfy the
requirements of authorship and fixation. The additional element,
originality, may be a more difficult standard to meet, particularly
288. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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when the phrase is short. Though the standard of creativity is
higher for short phrases, copyright protection is still a possibility.
Jokes have been considered sufficiently creative in some instances.
If the short phrase, alone, lacks sufficient creativity the author
could bolster the insufficiency by attempting to copyright the
phrase in conjunction with other creative elements such as font,
colors and arrangement. Despite the lack of precedent, copyright
appears to be the most plausible way to protect creative
merchandise.
Still, companies, like T-Shirt Hell, whose merchandise derives
its value from celebrity exploitation and/or mockery could face
considerable problems. First, it is unlikely that such phrases, no
matter how creative, will ever be granted legal protection. A
celebrity's right of publicity is likely to trump the t-shirt or
merchandise creator's right to sell and protect the profitable goods.
Second, the creator of the exploitative phrase could be held liable
for damages to the commercial value of that celebrity's persona.
A celebrity's right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is
exploited for commercial purposes.
Creative merchandise that does not exploit a celebrity may be
entitled to copyright protection. Alternatively, T-Shirt Hell, and
other companies that earn their livelihood by creating exploitative
merchandise, should forget about protecting such phrases. Instead,
they should be thankful that the Osbournes, and other celebrities
depicted on the company's shirts, have not filed suit against them.
Carolyn E. Miller
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